

THE DIA HALF-YEAR REPORT

1st HALF OF 2022

ABSTRACT

The analysis of the criminal scenario and the overview of the counteraction by law enforcement agencies in the first half of 2022 confirm the long-term trend that highly structured organized crime groups prefer to operate *under the radar*. Since they are less visible their dangerousness is underestimated, making them very insidious. It is a cross-cutting trend that affects all mafia-type organized crime groups since it allows them to infiltrate the social sector and make business safely without raising the attention of law enforcement agencies. Organized crime groups prefer to use a silent approach in order to refine and increase their capacity to infiltrate the economic and productive sectors also with the complicity of entrepreneurs, professionals, institutional and political representatives who are officially extraneous to such groups. The projects aimed at developing entrepreneurial activities in the post-pandemic phase and the package of measures focused on stimulating the Italian economic recovery, also with the European financial support through the *National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP)*, are undoubtedly very attractive for organized crime groups.

In Italy, the law enforcement and judicial authorities continue to focus their attention on the fight against conventional mafia-type organized crime groups and foreign organizations setting up in Italy criminal syndicates. The new organization of the DIA at the local level is a clear example of this commitment. Some Resident Offices have been upgraded to Field Offices and on 1st March 2022 the Resident Office in Potenza was opened, as urged by the national and local institutions in order to increase the antimafia counteraction and monitoring in the area. Moreover, a DIA Resident Office was opened in Cagliari on 12th October 2022, so to improve the fight against crime groups operating in Sardinia.

As always, the present report gives a description of the criminal scenario, focusing on the development and changes of mafia-type organized crime groups but also giving details of the orders providing for the dissolution of the local governmental bodies. The report makes use of charts showing the evolution of organized crime and the incidence of the main crime groups, based on the results of the investigations carried out by the DIA and the law enforcement agencies.

The recent results of the most important investigations once again show that ‘**ndrangheta** stubbornly continues to have a business-oriented approach. It is able to

diversify its investments, using them also in the licit economic sectors, which are most affected by the present financial crisis.

The investigations accomplished have also highlighted that the approach of Calabrian organized crime groups is to provide financial support to cash-strapped entrepreneurs so to take over their corporate assets and management and increase their profits.

The antimafia activity carried out by the Prefects in the region of origin of the 'ndrangheta and in the regions where it operates has revealed that 'ndrine are able to infiltrate the administrative and electoral bodies of the local governmental authorities in order to take control of the public resources, state and EU financial funds also in view of increasing social consensus.

The 'ndrangheta has a remarkable business-oriented approach also outside its area of origin thanks to the huge economic resources coming from drug trafficking. The Calabrian syndicates continue to be the privileged counterpart of the South-American cartels, since for a long time they have proved to be very reliable at the criminal and financial levels.

In the last years, also Western Africa, particularly the Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau and Ghana, has become an increasingly important hub for the 'ndrangheta international drug trafficking.

The intercontinental drug flows did not remarkably decrease even when the mobility was reduced during the Pandemic.

Important investigative results achieved in the first half of the year 2022 have confirmed the key role played by the ports in Gioia Tauro (for the region of Calabria), Genoa, La Spezia, Vado Ligure and Leghorn for the Northern Tyrrhenian Sea. Outside their region of origin, besides infiltrating the economic-entrepreneurial sectors, the *cosche* try to duplicate the original mafia-style patterns, based on the traditional core values. The 'ndrangheta projections convey the idea that Organized Crime Groups are the high-ranking bodies in charge of working out strategies, settling conflicts, abolishing or creating new *locali*. The investigations have led so far to the identification of 46 *locali* in Northern Italy (Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, Veneto, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige).

The judicial proceedings have also highlighted that Calabrian crime groups are able to cooperate with different mafia-type groups, based on a business-driven strategy. Their alliances are based on specific needs rather than on consolidated common criminal interests. This especially applies to the relations with foreign crime groups, particularly Albanian and South American syndicates.

Because of its closely-knit structure, its military capacity and the fact that it is deep-rooted in the territory, the '*ndrangheta* is still the most powerful organization also beyond its conventional areas of influence, since it has interests in almost all regions (Lazio, Piedmont and Valle d'Aosta, Liguria, Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Abruzzi and Sardinia). Its projections go beyond national boundaries and involve many European countries (Spain, France, United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta), the Australian and American continents (Canada, USA, Colombia, Peru and Argentina).

In **Sicily** *cosa nostra* continues to operate throughout most of its territory, with consolidated links in other Italian regions and with renewed relations with families which have long settled down abroad, including oversea countries. As far as Cosa *nostra* groups in Palermo and in the Western provinces of Sicily are concerned, the absence of a consolidated and acknowledged leadership, which makes rules and hierarchical bonds less stringent, is allegedly encouraging new members coming from mafia families to become the bosses of *manadamenti* and families. Meanwhile, old men of honor are trying to be recredited in their organized crime group once released from prison.

The large number of law enforcement operations and the vigorous antimafia preventive activities have forced Sicilian organized crime groups to constantly adapt to new situations, reorganize and, sometimes, to regenerate. Recent investigations have also revealed that, after their release, many mafiosi have once again been involved in the criminal activities of their group of origin. However, in Sicily there are other native and foreign mafia-type organized crime groups, which coexist mainly with *cosa nostra* by virtue of a wide range of relations and balances.

The *stidda* and other mafia-like organized crime groups, such as *paracchi* and *famigghiedde* continue to operate in the area of Agrigento.

The Eastern side of the island is the operational area of other mafia-type crime groups. They are very dangerous although they are not part of *cosa nostra*. The situation in Catania is peculiar because of the coexistence of multiple crime groups: those that are the branches of Cosa Nostra and those that, though having the same structure, are separate groups. Moreover, the organized crime groups in Catania also try to expand their area of influence into the neighborhood. The lack of tightly structured branches generates different organizations which sometimes coexist, sharing the same areas to pursue their common illicit purposes. The present criminal balance is the outcome of a "changeable" and loosely knit mafia organization. Depending on temporarily leaderships or illegal business activities to manage or to compete for, the latter has in

time forged alliances, agreed on cease-fire or triggered violent conflicts between the different *clans*.

Cosa nostra in Catania and, to a lesser extent, the *stidda* in Gela are widespread in the area around Ibla but they are active also in the provinces of Siracusa and Ragusa.

Sicilian organized crime groups rarely use violence, confirming that they, particularly *cosa nostra*, want to avoid raising social alarm so to better pursue their own fundamental objectives: to accumulate wealth and achieve powerful positions.

The main criminal businesses of Sicilian mafia-type groups continue to be drug trafficking, extortions, usury, online gambling and betting, which are still very profitable activities. As far as drug trafficking is concerned, *cosa nostra* uses its best resources to coordinate and manage drug markets and street sales. The latter are usually entrusted to other criminal groups which are sometimes affiliated groups. At the suprarational level, *cosa nostra* has developed commercial relations, made alliances or is cooperating with other mafia-type organized crime groups (such as '*ndrangheta* and *camorra*) for the supply of huge drug quantities, including on a vast scale. In particular, the investigative results referring to the first six months of 2022 have proved that *cosa nostra* continues to have a privileged business channel with the '*ndrine* of Calabria, mainly for cocaine supply.

In the six months under study, extortions are - together with drug trafficking – another primarily source of livelihood of mafia families and of the relatives of the detained persons. In this regard, it must be pointed out that, instead of the conventional “pizzo” (protection money) alternative *modus operandi* are increasingly being used. The old extortion method, used by *cosa nostra* as a fundamental tool to control the area, is now replaced by other more persuasive methods, avoiding the use of violence but “simply” imposing the provision of goods, services and manpower, even at prices slightly higher than market prices.

Online gambling and betting are another very alluring sector for *cosa nostra*. They ensure extremely high profits with very low risks. In this regard, counteraction by the judicial and law enforcement authorities, including asset-related measures, has highlighted that the main mafia-type groups manage, directly or indirectly, gambling or betting businesses. Sometimes *cosa nostra* crime groups simply install slot machines at bars and tobacconist's so to control the area and facilitate the laundering of illicitly gained assets.

Sicily continues to host foreign mafia-type organized crime groups. Specifically, Nigerian crime groups, which are made up of secret cult groups using different symbols, pose a significant threat. Drug trafficking, prostitution and in some cases, trafficking in human beings are their core business and their operational areas are

mainly Palermo and Catania. Indeed, it is worth mentioning that *cosa nostra*, has given them the green light to control street prostitution and drug pushing in some areas.

The activities carried out by the Sicilian mafia-type organized crime groups outside the region (Lazio, Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany) are mainly focused on infiltrating the economy through fiscal frauds and money laundering. Among the most affected foreign countries, mention must be made of Spain, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Romania, Malta, Canada, USA.

Campania is characterized by multiple and complex mafia-type organized crime groups, usually referred to as *camorra*. They have their own distinguished features, depending on the areas of influence and operation.

In the six-months under study the efforts of the judicial and law enforcement agencies, as well as of the DIA to counter mafia-type organized crime groups in this field has never ceased. The content of the judicial proceedings and the checks carried out within the antimafia preventive measures have outlined a comprehensive picture of the present situation of camorra-type organized crime in Campania.

The large camorra clans that manage all the most profitable illicit activities in Naples and the more structured camorra clans that control most of the region have become a sort of “mafia enterprises”, which can be competitive and appealing also in the economic and financial sectors.

Camorra has become an integral part of the society, infiltrating any sector of the civil society. It seems undefeatable but the anti-mafia antibodies continue their vigorous struggle to curb it.

The more advanced and structured clans have “relocated” the economic activities used to launder the money and reinvest the illicit proceeds outside regional and national borders. Their main goal is to transfer their wealth to safer and more profitable geographical areas.

However, it is worth mentioning that camorra-type organized crime groups are characterized by two parallel and overlapping dimensions: a more visible and tangible “street” dimension, severely affecting the life of the population in Campania and a more subtle, less evident but more dangerous dimension focusing on economy and finance also by means of collusive practices and corruption.

The dangerousness of camorra-type organized crime groups is represented not only by the most evident crimes raising social alarm but also by their huge economic power. This threat is more dangerous though less perceived by public opinion. The huge profits coming from the illicit activities are reinvested in the legal economy, severely altering the rules of the market and the business freedom, polluting whole commercial sectors.

In some cases, they have thoroughly infiltrated the public administration, irremediably altering the decision-making process of public bodies.

Their infiltration power is linked above all to the money they earn from drug trafficking and the cash money obtained from this illicit activity makes the legal economic system, which suffers from a prolonged liquidity crisis, more vulnerable. The economic crisis is accompanied by an overall crisis in terms of values affecting wide segments of local governmental bodies, senior public officers and economic operators, who attracted by the allure of easy money are ready to use collusive practices and corruption, helping camorra to become an integral part of the legal system.

In this framework, the more structured camorra organized crime groups with a solid criminal tradition fully use their ability to enjoy relations and act as intermediators at the social, political and economic levels, developing dangerous links to pursue their criminal and business-oriented interests.

The economic capital and the “*share capital*” are altering the rules of the free market. In those cases where it is proved that camorra has infiltrated the elected bodies of public authorities, also their decision-making process has been altered. It is an extremely dangerous phenomenon as it comes out from the analysis of a large number of personal and asset-related measures, antimafia bans and judicial orders issued against enterprises and business activities registered, also fictitiously, to persons linked to the most influential camorra-type families.

Indeed, *the camorra* is extremely efficient in the economic and financial sectors, providing financial support to enterprises and business activities in difficulties and acting as a broker in view of setting up wide-ranging relations so to capitalize the huge illicitly gained profits. The constant search for new and alternative economic markets has made the crime groups of Campania focus their attention on the trade in hydrocarbons, both whole and retail trade. Recently they have also been dealing with the collection of used cooking oil, which today has become a very profitable business activity.

The structure of the *camorra* in Campania is made up of historical clans, whose members are closely linked by family ties. Such syndicates have in time become prevailing in the criminal scenario of the region. They are able to deeply control the illicit markets, above all the drug market, and the legal economy by holding, either indirectly or even directly, shares of enterprises and businesses. In some cases they monitor the whole production chain.

There are also smaller groups, including family-structured groups, which identify with the area where they operate, often represented by districts or even buildings. Such

groups use violence to settle the conflicts with other clans of the same cartel or to take over open-air drug markets from rival groups.

The clans operating in the city of Naples are highly competitive and often use violence and weapons. Such a *modus operandi* raises social alarm and divert the attention of public opinion from the increasing capacity of the huge cartels to use corruption and collusive practices to infiltrate the economic and social sectors through traditional criminal *modi operandi* and trust.

Beyond the region, Campanian mafia-type organized crime groups focus their interest on drug trafficking and money laundering, particularly in Latium, Liguria, Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Abruzzi, Molise and Sardinia. As to the most affected foreign countries, mention must be made of Spain, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Romania.

In **Apulia** there are three macro and heterogeneous criminal scenarios, represented by the *mafia foggiana*, *criminalità barese* and *sacra corona unita*. (Mafia in the area of Foggia, organized crime groups in the area of Bari and *sacra corona unita*).

The vibrant criminal activity that has characterized the whole six months shows that the balance and relations between the criminal groups are very dynamic with conflicts between opposing clans and within the clans themselves.

Some internal conflicts are apparently linked to the pressure exerted by the new recruits, who are determined to climb up the criminal hierarchy and by the sudden changes in the alliances aimed at gaining ground and power in their respective areas of influence. The functional relationships developed between the organized crime groups operating in the Apulian cities and sometimes in the neighboring areas are unique in the criminal scenario under study. The military control of the area and a business-oriented approach are fundamental components of the Apulian organized crime groups. In this way they are able to expand their criminal interests also outside the region. Their main purpose is maximizing illicit profits disguising them in the vital components of the civil society, with heavy repercussions on the legal economy and the well-functioning of local institutions.

From this point of view, the *criminalità barese* continues to be a *business-oriented mafia-type group*. The main syndicates in the area of Bari have reportedly developed advanced investment strategies and are expert in infiltrating local public authorities, influencing the economic flows, the free market and the decision-making process of the public administration.

In the area of Bari, the Japigia *clan* reportedly plays a core role in mingling the criminal business with the political and administrative sectors by developing collusive practices in the public sector. The clan also interacts with top-level members of other criminal groups.

In the area of Salento, Apulian mafia-type organized groups follow a business-oriented approach. In this area they find the ideal ground to infiltrate the sensitive production sectors, often influencing and addressing politics, as well as the economic and entrepreneurial strategies.

In the province of Lecce, the deep infiltration of organized crime has also led to the dissolution of the town council in Neviano (LE), based on concrete evidence highlighting that some local public administrators had been subject to mafia influence. Also in Salento, the *clans* of the *sacra corona unita* reportedly make constant use of extortions and the other mafia practices commonly referred to as “*metodo mafioso ambientale*”.

It seems that even the mafia-type groups in the area of Foggia do not refrain from taking advantage of the alluring resources of the main economic-financial sectors with the assistance of complaisant entrepreneurs and local administrators.

In the six months under study, despite incisive counteraction by law enforcement and judicial authorities, the province of Foggia stands out in terms of bloody struggles and assaults aimed at gaining the control of the area.

The heinous crimes that took place in the first half of 2022 are allegedly the outcome of precarious balances in the high-ranking structures, highlighting imminent changes in the organization, alliances or, more simply, in the previous and tacit non -aggression agreements.

The analysis of the *modus operandi* of the mafias operating in the province of Barletta-Andria-Trani has also revealed that they still aim at conditioning the public administration, as documented by the dissolution of the City Council in Trinitapoli.

In the city of Bari, the historical conflicts between the large criminal syndicates affect the criminal scenario of the province. The crimes committed in the city are common to the other metropolitan areas also as far as the changes in the alliances and conflicts are concerned. The analysis of the evolutionary trends reveals that the overall criminal instability could be influenced not only by the recent and upcoming release of Bari's camorra bosses but also by the willingness to act as cooperating witnesses by some outstanding members.

Throughout the region, the syndicates can rely on huge amounts of money earned from very profitable illicit traffics such as drug trafficking. In this sector, mention must be made of the consolidated links between the land of eagles and important Asian supply channels for as marijuana, heroin, hashish, cocaine and synthetic drugs.

Their good nose for business also steers the criminal activities of the Apulian mafias towards other forms of profit such as cigarette smuggling and, as already mentioned, the management of online gambling and betting, including the attractive sectors of waste management and tourism.

Although tobacco smuggling is not the core *business* of organized crime groups, it is still a very alluring sector, being one of the most lucrative items.

The Apulian organized crime groups are mainly focused on drug trafficking and the so-called "criminal commuting" aimed at committing predatory crimes. Their presence has been detected in Lombardy, Veneto, Abruzzo, Molise. There are also contacts with foreign countries, in particular with Albania for the drug supply by sea, but also with Spain, the Netherlands, Germany and Romania.

Basilicata's unique criminal scenario, characterized by native organized crime groups and mafia-type syndicates coming from the neighboring regions, *'ndrangheta*, *camorra* and *Apulian mafias*, led on 7 March 2022 to the opening of the DIA Resident Office in Potenza.

The economic difficulties of the businesses operating in the region and the high unemployment rate of its citizens make Basilicata very vulnerable to the pressure of the bordering mafia *cosche*, which are very interested in the huge amounts of public funds invested in the area.

Although law enforcement and judicial authorities have in time curbed the activities of the various criminal syndicates, like other criminal groups, they are always ready to regenerate, making proselytism and diversifying their illicit activities. They have developed a “business-oriented” approach, which increases the risks of infiltration in the public sector. In this respect, the present criminal scenario reflects that in Lucania there are multiple historical clans and organized crime groups originating from Calabria and Apulia. In detail, there are three separate areas where the various mafia-type crime groups operate: the area of Potenza and its *hinterland*, the area of Vulture Melfese in the north of the province and the area along the Jonian coast, also called the Metaponto area, in the province of Matera. Although the illicit activities carried out are similar, these three macro areas differ in terms of vulnerability to mafia infiltration. As far as Matera is concerned, its weakness is represented by its geographic position, as a hub between Apulia, Calabria and Campania.

Foreign organized crime groups in Italy are heterogeneous, dynamic and ever-changing syndicates, which are consolidating their presence and are becoming more and more independent in managing important transnational traffics.

The lack of conflicts that usually characterize the relations between native and foreign mafias is often symptomatic of a coexistence between the two, which sometimes makes them cooperate in pursuing joint illicit interests, such as drug and weapon trafficking.

In Central and Northern Italy, resident foreign organized crime groups are more independent and autonomous in comparison to those operating in the regions under the influence of Italian traditional mafias. The relations between the syndicates with different backgrounds are apparently more fluid in the southern regions, considering that, although more-structured foreign organized crime groups are usually subordinated and subject to native mafias, in Sicily and Campania there are more and more groups that are independent from local mafias.

It is possible to assume that the strategic and profit-oriented alliances between ethnic organizations and native organized crime members will develop new evolutionary trends in the overall criminal scenario.

Albanian organized crime groups are the most deep-rooted in the area. They have slowly spread through the area and are able to interact, before any other syndicates, with native organized crime groups as far as drug trafficking is concerned. The structure of Albanian *clans* is very similar to Calabrian *'ndrine*: i.e. crime groups that are closely knit with other families of the same ethnic group by family ties or forced marriages. This allows them to increase their power and avoid internal conflicts in controlling the area and divide the illicitly gained profits. Albanian organized crime groups have in time become a point of reference as far as heroin and cannabis supply and distribution in Italy are concerned.

The interests of the Nigerian organized crime groups are mainly focused on the trafficking in human beings for the purposes of prostitution and forced begging as well as on drug trafficking. The latter is sometimes carried out in cooperation with Albanian organized crime groups. They are also involved in forged documents, frauds, including cyber frauds, money counterfeit and, according to the latest evidence, also in the crimes against the person or property.

They are “multi-level ethnic criminal groups” where only a small number of their members act as drug pushers. In terms of economic and social dangerousness, the so-called *secret cults* play a major role in fact such groups are characterized by a hierarchical and paramilitary structure with affiliation rites and codes of conduct. However, the Nigerian mafia has consolidated and established its role throughout Italy, even in Sicily where the pervasiveness of *cosa nostra* leaves little room for other criminal groups.

Chinese organized crime groups in Italy have a hierarchical structure, based on close family and cooperation links. Such syndicates are highly impermeable and it is impossible for other crime groups to mix or cooperate with them. They seldomly develop functional alliances with Italian syndicates or participate in small multi-ethnic crime groups.

Chinese organized crime groups are involved in: extortions and robberies, almost exclusively to the detriment of their fellow citizens; exploitation of prostitution; financial crimes; illegal money transfers. Moreover, the Chinese organized crime groups have the monopoly of most of the methamphetamine market, including pushing. It is an under the radar approach, i.e. it is not visible. As a result, Chinese organized crime groups are very insidious, it is hardly difficult to fight against them also because they are very closed, their members are constantly moving and it is not easy to find interpreters for their different idioms.

Romanian organized crime groups in Italy are subdivided into two different categories. On the one hand there are poorly structured groups, which are involved in the

commission of predatory crimes, causing insecurity in the population; on the other there are well -structured organizations, which in time have developed features very similar to native mafia-type organized crime groups. The latter have focused their attention on more profitable activities, such as drug and weapon trafficking, as well as trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution, cybercrimes, predatory crimes and crimes against property.

Moreover, in the six months under study, links between local and Romanian organized crime groups have been identified, in particular as far as the exploitation of prostitution is concerned. By contrast, the analysis of the criminal phenomena has not revealed the involvement of native mafia-type organized crime groups. The latter are still not interested, at least directly, in the prostitution business.

South American organized crime groups mainly operate in several regions in Northern Italy and, to a lesser extent, in Latium. Such syndicates are involved in crimes against property and the exploitation of prostitution. They cooperate with other foreign or Italian organized crime groups in drug trafficking from Latin America. Cocaine trafficking is carried out by air and sea routes, using stop-overs so to elude the control by law enforcement and customs agencies.

Organized crime groups from the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries are involved in the commission of crimes against property, drug and weapon trafficking, aiding and abetting illegal migration, exploitation of prostitution, smuggling and copper thefts.

North-Central African organized crime groups are involved in drug trafficking and pushing as well as in the crimes linked to the trafficking in human beings (which often go along with tobacco smuggling) and foreign workers. It has recently come out that they are also involved in financial crimes. Although Tunisian and Moroccan organized crime groups are less structured than Albanian and Nigerian syndicates, they are in charge of trafficking the hashish produced in Maghreb and in the street pushing of other substances within more structured multi-ethnic organizations.

Organized crime groups made up of individuals coming from the Middle East and South-East Asia are mainly involved in aiding and abetting illegal migration, the exploitation of undeclared workers and drug trafficking, mainly carried out together with the exploitation of prostitution. Sometimes they are multi-ethnic organized crime groups (south-eastern groups made up of Indian and Pakistani nationals) which are supposed to cooperate with organized crime groups from the Balkan area, as well as with Turkish and Greek syndicates.

The analysis of the evolutionary trends of mafia-type organized crime groups suggests that it is fundamental to focus the attention on the illicitly gained assets, attacking them by means of judicial tools and **asset-related preventive measures**.

The number of preventive measures taken in the first half of 2022 shows that the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate considers the attack against the assets that are illicitly gained by mafia-type organized crime groups as a strategic priority. As a result, the intense activities carried out by the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate have always been aimed at increasing the fight against the infiltration of organized crime in the Italian economic sector.

At the domestic level, in the period under study, 21 proposals for the application of preventive measures were submitted to the relevant courts, 16 of which were jointly signed by the DIA and the judicial authority and one of which was jointly signed by the DIA, the judicial authority and the Questore of the relevant province. Moreover, 3 reports proposing such measures were drawn up by the the DIA on request of the relevant public prosecutor's office.

As to the period under study, it is important to highlight that there was a wider use of the legal tool represented by the "judicial administration", pursuant to art. 34 of the Legislative Decree 159/2011. In the first half of 2022, 4 proposals for the application of the judicial administration were submitted (3 of which were submitted to the courts having jurisdiction and one as a report submitted to the requesting Prosecutor's Office as well as the *ex-novo* application of 1 measure (involving 6 companies) and one measure requesting the postponement of the judicial administration for one company.

The following tables summarize the number of the orders of seizure and confiscation carried out in the first half of 2022 as a result of the activities performed by the DIA on its own initiative.

SEIZURES 1 ST HALF OF 2022	
On proposal	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director on his own initiative</i>	72,009,697.68
<i>Judicial authority based on the DIA investigations</i>	20,845,293.96
TOTAL	92,854,991.64

CONFISCATIONS 1 ST HALF OF 2022	
On proposal	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director on his own initiative</i>	15,646,756.04
<i>Judicial authority based on the DIA investigations</i>	27,757,325.71
TOTAL	43,404,081.75

Below is a detailed list of the seizures and confiscations carried out in the first half of 2022 with reference to each mafia-type organized crime group.

‘NDRANGHETA

SEIZURES 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
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<i>The DIA Director</i>	7	24,928,333.33
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	8	8,827,540.00
TOTAL	15	33,755,873.33

CONFISCATIONS 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	6	2,268,366.04
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	4	22,585.00
TOTAL	10	2,290,951.04

COSA NOSTRA

SEIZURES 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	7	7,163,200.00
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	1	2,796,624.00
TOTAL	8	9,959,824.00

CONFISCATIONS 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No.	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	3	5,763,200.00
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	3	25,014,285.71

TOTAL	6	30,777,485.71
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CAMORRA

SEIZURES 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	3	34,558,822.43
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	4	8,221,129.96
TOTALE	7	42,779,952.39

CONFISCATIONS 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	1	580,000.00
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	1	500,000.00
TOTALE	2	1,080,000.00

ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS FROM APULIA AND LUCANIA

SEIZURES 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	2	3,859,229.92
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	0	0.00
TOTALE	2	3,859,229.92

CONFISCATIONS 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	2	7,035,190.00
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	0	0.00
TOTALE	2	7,035,190.00

OTHER ITALIAN ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS

SEIZURES 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	1	1,500,112.00
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	1	1,000,000.00

TOTALE	2	2,500,112.00
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CONFISCATIONS 1 ST HALF OF 2022		
On proposal	No	Value of the Assets
<i>The DIA Director</i>	0	0.00
<i>J.A. based on the DIA investigations</i>	3	2,220,455.00
TOTALE	3	2,220,455.00

The huge financial resources that are accumulated by criminal groups as a result of different types of illegal activities need to be laundered. To this end, the mafias try to find increasingly sophisticated methods in order to hinder the identification of the real ownership of the illegally gained assets.

Therefore, it is necessary to identify the future mafias' action trends, paying great attention to their ability to **infiltrate the economy**. Under this perspective, the DIA, also in the first half of 2022, focused its attention on the procedures for awarding tenders and executing public works, in particular the significant works linked to the "*Urgent provisions for the town of Genoa*", the "*The reconstruction works following the 2016 earthquake*" and the so-called "*Major Works*".

The monitoring activity also concerned the structure of the companies involved in the execution of the works, in order to identify possible infiltration. The checks targeted both the direct execution of the works and a number of related activities such as the access to construction sites ordered by the Prefect in order to control on the spot the irregular employment of workers.

In that regard, **615** monitoring activities were carried out, as better explained in the table below, which sums up the results subdivided into macro-areas.

AREAS	1ST HALF OF 2022	
	COMPANIES	PERSONS
North	79	2,057
Central	32	123
South	504	3,767
Foreign contries	0	0
TOTAL	615	5,947

In the context of the activities aimed at **preventing the use of the financial system for money-laundering purposes**, the Legislative Decree no. 231 dated 21 November 2007, gives the DIA the power to check the infringement of the obligations laid down

by the same decree and the task of carrying out in-depth investigations concerning organized crime, the information received in the context of international cooperation and the reporting of suspicious transactions – STRs sent by the *Financial Intelligence Unit of Italy*.

In the six months under study, the exponential growth of STRs that has been registered in the last years has been balanced by the adoption of new analysis and study models linked to a constant update of the relevant IT application, i.e. the system dubbed “*EL.I.O.S. –Elaborazioni Investigative Operazioni Sospette*”, (investigative processing of suspicious operations) tailoring it to the new investigative needs. The DIA, using the new engineering platform, processes all the STRs in real time so that all information can be used at the operational level. In compliance with the info-investigative information exchange, established by the protocols signed by the DIA and in compliance with the legislation, the STRs which, after three analysis processes (massive, phenomenological and risk) potentially seem to be linked to organized crime, are transmitted to the *Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo* (National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate), which, in turn is responsible for forwarding them to the competent *Direzioni Distrettuali Antimafia* (District Antimafia Directorates) if there are links to ongoing investigations or if they are useful to exercise the proposing power of the *National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor* (pursuant to art. 371 bis of the code of criminal procedure).

In this framework, in the first half of 2022, the DIA analysed 73,037 STRs linked to **626,123** subjects already reported, **422,456** of whom were individuals.

It is worth mentioning that in this period of time, approximately **4%** of the **73,037** STRs analysed by the DIA were connected to virtual currencies. In compliance with the guidelines defined in the previous six months, based on the increase of financial operations carried out by means of the new technologies and the exchange of digital tokens, such as cryptocurrencies and *NFTs*, a permanent working group was set up in the period under study aimed at analysing this phenomenon and identifying possible points of contact with organized crime.

In order to prevent mafia infiltration in the national economy, among the operational instruments, mention must be made of the exclusive power of the DIA Director to have access, carry out checks, request data and information, as well as to carry out inspections. Reference is made to article 1, par. 4, of the Law Decree 6 September 1982, no. 629, authorizing the execution of targeted measures against entities subject to anti money-laundering obligations. Such measures are aimed at checking if they are, also indirectly, acting inside corporate, managing and controlling bodies, on behalf of mafia-type organizations or if they are controlling the financial operations of third parties suspected of mafia links.

As a result of the other activities concluded during the six-month period, **10** orders were signed by the DIA Director and carried out by the competent local Offices.

Among its several tasks, the DIA also takes part in the Financial Security Committee (*Comitato di Sicurezza Finanziaria* C.S.F), a body in charge of monitoring the system aimed at preventing and combating terror financing, money laundering, the activities of countries threatening international peace and security, the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as of implementing the freezing provisions ordered by the United Nations, the European Union, and the national authorities. In the six months under study, the DIA answered all the different requests made by the C.S.F. to authorize the transfer of funds, to issue guarantees, to authorize the exemption from freezing orders, as laid down by the EU regulations or by the UN resolutions. Moreover, the DIA carried out wide-ranging checks against **846** natural and legal persons.

It is well known that Italian and foreign organized crime groups aim at going beyond national boundaries, posing an increasing threat to the security of the states, their economies and the rights of their citizens. As a result, the state economies will be in the future more and more polluted by organized crime groups acting as “*multiservice providers*”. They will be able to operate in the digital work, networking and developing operational and strategical alliances between the different groups, putting common purposes ahead of internal conflicts. On the other hand, the limited use of violence, mainly abroad, and the resulting business-oriented approach highlight that the public society may run the risk of underestimating the social dangerousness of organized crime.

In order to deal effectively with such threats, at international fora, the DIA has always emphasized the need for a common language and shared methodologies to maximize the effectiveness of the fight against criminal organizations. Indeed, the new scenarios require joint and coordinated actions at every level, also considering the recent interest of mafia organized crime groups in cryptocurrencies as well as an effective harmonization of the legal systems at the EU level.

As far as the cooperation between law enforcement agencies is concerned, mention must be made of the project setting up the “@ON Antimafia Operational Network”, which was conceived by the DIA and of which the DIA is Project Leader. As thoroughly described in the Focus of this report, the @ON Network was launched in 2013 as an instrument developed by the DIA to encourage the operational exchange of information on organized crime groups operating in the EU Member States, to support transnational investigations and the requesting countries by the quick deployment on the spot of investigators expert in the field. Among the operations carried out in the

six months under study by the DIA and law enforcement partners, in agreement with the relevant judicial authorities and EUROJUST, the @ON Network and EUROPOL supported the following operations: the above-mentioned operation “Black Eagle” on 15 February 2022, which dismantled a drug trafficking and money laundering Albanian crime group, as well as operation “*Propaggine/Timoteo*” on **10 May 2022**, described in the chapters referring to Calabria and Latium and focused on a ‘*ndrangheta*’ clan which was deep-rooted in Rome and had international projections.

In the six months under study, the @ON Network also supported 80 investigations carried out by the investigative units of the other @ON Member States and financed 286 operational missions in favour of 1000 investigators, leading to the arrest of 480 persons, including 6 fugitives and to the seizure of about 146 million euros, drugs and weapons.

In the light of the above, it is evident that the global approach is the only way to fight against organized crime. If mafias have no borders and can get anywhere in order to meet their needs, law enforcement and judicial authorities too have to go beyond their jurisdiction, and be able to plan and develop proactive cooperation links at the global level. There is a need for an effective and prompt exchange of information and the long-awaited harmonization of the legal systems can no longer be delayed.

The data and the analyses of the period under study confirm the trends of the previous half-year reports, in line with the results of the Parliamentary Commission of inquiry on the mafia phenomenon. As stated by the Commission in a recent report: “...*in the last decades organized crime groups under article 416 bis of the criminal code have undergone a profound transformation, showing great flexibility and adaptability as well as great capacity to regenerate themselves...*”. They have developed complex organizational structures and modus operandi so to constantly adapt to the ever-changing social and economic scenarios, relying on relationships so to silently infiltrate the productive sector rather than on overt violence (which is nonetheless used if necessary) “...*accelerating the long-lasting transformation and infiltration process...*”. *The different mafia-style organized crime groups have a more and more entrepreneurial and business-oriented approach based on the huge assets they have ... Mafia-style organized crime groups have already their own companies or may rely on closely connected businesses...able to increasingly infiltrate private economy by infecting healthy companies; in their constant search for new reinvestment and money laundering channels they also invade new economic activities of the public sector...or anyway sectors benefiting from public funds*”... The capacity of mafia-style organized crime groups to conceal their illicit purposes behind apparently normal activities, sometimes entrepreneurial-minded activities, makes it also easier to give rise to

corruptive practices, which are a prerogative of the so-called “mafia bourgeoisie”. Mafia bourgeoisie is as dangerous as mafias. Judge Falcone himself was supposed to mention it when he stated: *“Mafia, and I want to repeat it, is not a cancer born by chance from healthy tissue. It lives in perfect symbiosis with the myriad of protectors, accomplices, informers and debtors of all kinds, large and small riggers, the intimidated and blackmailed people who belong to every level of society. This is the breeding ground for Cosa Nostra, with all its direct and indirect implications, conscious or not, voluntary or compelled, often enjoying the consent of the population”* (see Giovanni Falcone, *Cose di Cosa nostra*, in cooperation with M. Padovani, Rizzoli, Milano 1991).